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Abstract: This Commentary examines three issues raised in Professor
Thomas D. Griffith's Article on the connection between progressive tax-
ation and subjective well-being, focusing on the selection of happiness as
the measure of the gains of redistribution, the ability to measure happi-
ness or subjective well-being, and the implications of using happiness
analysis in determining tax policy. After arguing that the progressive
taxation debate would benefit from further exploration of why happiness
is the appropriate measure of success, this Commentary raises concerns
about relying on self-reporting of subjective well-being and how happiness
studies should be interpreted and can be improved. Finally, this Com-
mentary notes that studies of income and happiness may inform tax
policy design by helping to determine the appropriate balance between
taxes and expenditures, outlining a role for the government in informing
taxpayers' perceptions of happiness, and focusing additional research
necessary for an effective progressive taxation policy.
INTRODUCTION
Professor Thomas D. Griffith's Article begins with the enticing
proposition of linking taxation and happiness—words not often con-
nected in the taxation literature. Taxation and happiness become in-
tertwined in the analysis of progressive taxation and the arguments
favoring redistribution of income. The Article accepts the premise
that some level of redistribution is desirable and seeks to answer the
remaining but important question of how much redistribution is op-
timal. A key component of this inquiry concerns the determination of
the welfare gains from redistribution.' Measuring gains from redistri-
bution has always been a daunting task because the inquiry is empiri-
cally difficult and requires the incorporation of other fields of study.
Nonetheless, if our goal is to develop progressive tax policy more
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida, Frederick C. Levitt College of Law.
1 Such gains would then be weighed against any costs.
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thoroughly, we must attempt to define what constitutes utility or wel-
fare and determine how it should be measured.
Reflecting the core elements in Professor Griffith's analysis, my
comments fall into the following three categories: (1) establishing the
relationship between the progressive taxation analysis and the selec-
tion of happiness as the measure of gains from redistribution, (2) ex-
amining the existing happiness research and literature (outside taxa-
tion), and (3) discussing the implications of using the happiness
analysis for tax policy.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP
Professor Griffith does not contend that happiness is the exclu-
sive measure for evaluating taxpayers' gains from additional income,
but the reliance on this single measure does raise questions about
how we should envision utility or welfare. The beginning of the Arti-
cle suggests loosely (but certainly quite plausibly) that measures of
happiness from redistribution would be valuable in assessing tax poli-
cies.2
 Other parts of the Article, however, seem to equate happiness
affirmatively with the measurement of utility in the welfare analysis.
Happiness is a likely component of utility, but its selection requires us
to consider what the term does and does not capture. How, and in
what ways, is happiness a good proxy for measuring utility? How does
it compare to the concept of well-being, which the Article identifies
but puts aside at the outset? It may be productive to revisit the choice
of happiness as the focal measurement and distinguish it from other
terms and criteria that could contribute to utility. In some cases, it
may be that terms such as happiness or well-being are conceived
broadly or are intended to be effectively synonymous. Regardless,
though, additional clarification as to why happiness was selected and
what other measures might also be considered, as well as how they
could be coordinated, would move the progressive taxation debate
toward concrete tax policy choices.
2 Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 95 B.C. L. REV., 1363, 1369
(2004).
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II. MEASURING AND ASSESSING HAPPINESS
A. Reporting Concerns
As part of the process of measuring happiness for use in tax pol-
icy, Professor Griffith turns to the growing empirical and psychologi-
cal literature on happiness. Before drawing upon this fascinating body
of work, Professor Griffith first considers potential reporting prob-
lems in the measurement of happiness. 3 In addition to those outlined
in the Article, three others may be worth exploring. First, recent re-
search indicates that people tend to overestimate the intensity of both
good and bad future events ("impact bias"). 4 When this holds true, it
becomes relevant whether we area measuring happiness before or after
events occur. The assessment of happiness may be different at each
point. Further, we must. consider which point would be more relevant.
The "before" state may affect the party's behavior vis-a-vis the event,
but the "after" state may be experienced for a much longer time pe-
riod. Moreover, in cases of regularly repeated events (such as the
withholding of income taxes from a paycheck every month), how does
impact bias operate? This is a critical question because progressive tax
reform would initially take the form of a future event whose impact
individuals presumably would overstate (either positively or nega-
tively). Once in place, however, the reform would constitute the exist-
ing state of the world. Asking about impact bias in this manner high-
lights the distinction between happiness with regard to an anticipated
amount of income and happiness with regard to an anticipated tax
regime. To the extent we are seeking to measure utility (whether
through measures of happiness with income or some other criteria),
we face the question of how to incorporate the effect of the tax re-
gime itself (rather than simply the individual's end of the day in-
come) on self-reported happiness or satisfaction. Impact bias can exist
in both cases, but it need not be identical.
3 Id. at 1366-71.
4 See Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in the Forecasting
of Future Affective States, in FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAI, COGNI
TION 178, 185-94 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000); Daniel T. Gilbert et al., The Trouble with
Vronsky: Impact Bias in the Forecasting of Future Affective States, in THE WISDOM IN FEELING:
PSYCHOLOGICAL. PROCESSES IN EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 114, 116-37 (Lisa Feldman Bar-
rett & Peter Salovey eds., 2002); see also Timothy D. Wilson et al., Focalism: A Source of Dura-
bility Bias in Affective Forecasting, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 821, 821-35 (2000). This
claim is related to, but distinct from, concepts such as adaptation theory identified in Pro-
fessor Griffith's Article.
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Second, in terms of reporting accuracy, there may be a fundamen-
tal difference between asking about happiness (potentially more of a
transitory concept) and satisfaction (potentially more of a big-picture
concept). Generally, Professor Griffith uses the term "happiness," but
in some places, he seems to interchange it with "satisfaction," without
clarifying whether the terms are identical or, if not, how they are dif-
ferent. For example, "life satisfaction" seems to connote being in a
good position or place, whereas "happiness" seems to connote more
ephemeral feelings. Consider how many first year law students are
"happy." It might not be surprising if most students were "satisfied"
with their situation in life while simultaneously declaring themselves
"miserable." To the extent these concepts are different, which should
we seek to promote through the tax system?
The third reporting caveat derives from studies indicating that
individuals perceive and tolerate pain differently depending on their
perception of their ability to control the pain. 5
 For example, these
studies indicate that when individuals have more direct control over
the delivery of pain medication, they report less pain and anxiety and
require less pain medication.° These observations translate to the tax
arena—if we find that taxpayers seem averse to progressive (or more
progressive) taxation yet simultaneously purport to support redistri-
bution in society (such as through charitable contributions) the ap-
parent conflict may be due in part to the respondents' perceptions of
differences in control. One can cease voluntary charitable contribu-
tions (that promote redistribution) more readily than one can reduce
one's tax bill. This conclusion does not mean that taxes should be
voluntary, but it can help explain potential gaps between reported
views on redistribution versus progressive taxation.
5 See David A. Graves at al, Patient-Controlled Analgesia, 99 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 360,
364 (1983) (citing evidence that patients using patient-controlled pain devices experience
less pain and that anxiety may be minimized as compared to the traditional as needed"
pain medication regime involving multiple steps and the assistance of a nurse); EJ. Mun-
dell, Computer-Driven Pain Patch Shows Promise, 1-1EmmiDAY NEWS (Mar. 16, 2004), at
hup://www.healthday,com/view.cfm?id=517944 (noting the "psychological boost" from
patient-controlled pain devices and quoting Robert Coghill that "'pain becomes much
more manageable when there's a perception that it's controlled.... By giving patients the
ability to control pain, it makes it much easier to treat.'"); David R. Zimmerman, Taking
Care: Freedom from Pain, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1990, § 6, pt, 2 (Good Health Magazine), at 8.
6 See Graves et al., supra note 5, at 364; Mundell, supra note 5; Zimmerman, supra note 5.
2004]
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B. Implications of the Happiness Studies
Professor Griffith draws upon the following three categories of
happiness studies to illuminate the redistribution question: cross-
national comparisons, longitudinal studies, and individual assess-
ments. Each category provides interesting insight into the relation-
ship between income and happiness, although each also generates
questions for how such insights ultimately should be interpreted.
The cross-national studies, which consider how countries rank in
terms of happiness and income, treat each country effectively as an
individual unit and then compare countries to see what conclusions
can be drawn regarding income, happiness, and other possible fac-
tors. Although these studies are fascinating and useful, it would be
valuable to consider how a country-based study differs from studies
comparing actual individuals. A country is not an individual unit with
a particular happiness and income level, but rather it is a measure
drawn from all of the data points of happiness and income within that
country (by median or mean). Thus, unique but critical features re-
garding the country may be disguised by the creation of the single
data point for that country. Obvious possibilities include linguistic
and cultural differences between and among countries that would
influence the reporting within a country along a particular dimension
and thereby be reflected in the final numbers for that country. Profes-
sor Griffith identifies a number of these concerns, but additional fac-
tors may also be influential. For example, in the European Union
study covering the period from 1973 through 1998, residents of Den-
mark were found to be five times more likely to report that they were
very satisfied with their lives than residents of France or Italy.? Not
only might this marked disparity reflect underlying cultural differ-
ences, it might also be due to the shape of the income distribution
curve in the individual countries. That is, even if countries have rela-
tively similar per capita income, the countries' internal distributions
of income may be quite different. To the extent that studies of indi-
vidual assessments of happiness suggest that one's happiness with a
given level of income can be influenced by one's relative income rank-
ing in that society, the shape of a country's income distribution curve
may influence the happiness number emerging from that country.
T Ronald Inglehart & Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Genes, Culture, Democracy, and Happi-
ness, in CULTURE AND SUBJECTIVE WELL: BEING 165, 166-67 (Ed Diener & Eun kook M. Still
eds., 2000); see Griffith, supra note 2, at 1371.
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Another potential difficulty with relying on cross-national com-
parisons is the potential effect of "directional" or "trajectory" factors
on the residents' reported happiness. For example, in the World Val-
ues Survey discussed by Professor Griffith, Japan appears to be an in-
teresting outlier.8 It has median income comparable to Denmark,
Belgium, Iceland, and Norway, but reports significantly lower mean
life satisfaction.9 Again, one possible explanation is a cultural report-
ing difference. Another independent possibility, however, is what
might be termed a "directional" or "trajectory" explanation. Japan has
experienced significant economic stagnation or decline for some pe-
riod of time, and this reality may have shaped survey respondents'
views of their income situation. Having $X of income today may seem
less attractive to someone who had $X+$Y of income several years
ago. Moreover, if one's view of the future is less optimistic, then a
given amount of income today may generate less happiness than it
would under a different economic forecast.") This explanation could
also account for the fact that residents of the former Soviet block
seem more unhappy than their income would predict. If such resi-
dents perceive the stability and trajectory of their economy more
negatively than residents of countries with comparable or even lower
incomes, then residents of the former Soviet block may report lower
happiness.
Finally, in an effort to eliminate potential factors influencing the
income-happiness correlation, Professor Griffith cites studies arguing
that there is almost no correlation between human rights and subjec-
tive well-being (after controlling for income). Depending on what the
studies were measuring and comparing specifically, however, it is plau-
sible that (I) where human rights violations are combined with low
income, the respondents focus on subsistence needs (relating to ar-
guments raised by Professor Griffith about the unique nature of
money used for subsistence versus luxury goods), or (2) where human
rights violations are significant, respondents fear reprisal from non-
democratic governments, and thus report differently in the studies.
None of these questions regarding cross-national studies negates
their role or use. Instead, the questions seek to highlight additional
8 Griffith, supra note 2, at 1371-73.
9 Id. at 1372-73 figs.1 & 3.
IS For example, even if one's current income is not less than what it was in the past,
one's perception (due to unshakeable or looming economic conditions) of the future
chances of maintaining or improving one's position in society could influence one's re-
ported happiness in the present.
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areas of comparison or investigation that could further improve our
understanding of the factors contributing to happiness and their rela-
tionship to an individual's income. For example, to the extent that a
deeper examination of cross-country comparisons supports the hy-
pothesis that the income distribution curve for a country, as well as
specific levels of income, are relevant to happiness, we may draw dif-
ferent conclusions about the amount and the structure of progressiv-
ity that we would seek to pursue in our own income tax system.
The longitudinal studies cited by Professor Griffith of per capita
income and happiness in the United States over the period from 1972
through 1998 indicate that as per capita income increased (that is, the
country experienced some significant economic growth), reported
happiness did not similarly increase. 11 Initially, this result (reflected
also in the cited studies of France and Japan) seems inconsistent with
the cross-country comparisons that demonstrate a connection be-
tween per capita income and happiness. As Professor Griffith argues,
however, the cross-country comparisons reveal not only a basic con-
nection between per capita income and mean happiness, but also
demonstrate that among poorer nations, increasing per capita in-
come has a more significant impact on happiness than it does among
wealthier nations. Thus, Professor Griffith concludes that the longitu-
dinal studies of countries such as the United States, France, and Japan
can be understood as further.demonstrating that additional income is
not very significant for happiness in developed countries, but is sub-
stantially more significant for poorer nations. While that conclusion
seems consistent with the cross-national studies and with some of the
studies regarding individual assessments of happiness, there exists an-
other possible, yet unexplored, influence on the happiness numbers
for the developed countries. To the extent the longitudinal studies
cover a substantial period of time, it is possible that "symbol drift"—
changes in what is being studied—has occurred. Assuming demo-
graphic shifts in the respondents in each country (that is, if a large
group of "baby boomers" had come of survey age), the nature of sur-
vey responses for the country may have changed accordingly.
The final set of happiness studies, which examines individual
happiness within a nation, offers another window into the effect of
income on happiness. These studies eliminate many of the variables—
cultural, linguistic, political, or other macro factors—at the national
level that can plague cross-national comparisons. At the same time,
II Griffith, supra note 2, at 1375-78.
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these studies allow us to consider other factors that influence percep-
tions of income. For example, cited evidence that the average happi-
ness of a reporting cohort remains fairly stable over lifetimes (even
though income grows significantly) can be viewed, as Professor Grif-
fith suggests, as consistent with the longitudinal data that higher in-
come levels contribute little to happiness, at least among wealthier
nations. The cohort data may point, however, to an alternative con-
clusion—one linked to the aging of the reporting group in cohort
studies. It may be that one's happiness with a given level of income
operates partly as a function of age and expectations for that age
level. Thus, as income increases over one's life, happiness does not
increase commensurately because the additional income in fact
represents an expected and perhaps needed financial boost." Such
an observation regarding cohort studies does not reject the conten-
tion that additional income does not markedly increase happiness, or
that income effects on happiness have a rivalrous or comparative as-
pect. Rather, it contends that age and expectations may impact the
effect of income on happiness. Further, it maintains that studies in-
volving aging or shifting populations (regardless of whether the aging
or shifting population was in fact an intended feature of the study)
should account for such effects in drawing conclusions about the na-
ture and strength of the income-happiness relationship.' 3 Moreover,
as we consider a range of potential progressive taxation policies, the
impact of income on happiness at different ages may guide the struc-
ture and design of tax policy.
Another feature of the income-happiness relationship, drawn
from the studies of individuals, concerns the rivalrous nature of in-
come. Studies indicate that individuals show more rivalry with respect
to income than leisure. Part of the explanation for this observation,
however, may derive not from some inherent difference in competi-
tiveness over income as compared to leisure, but rather from the fact
that individuals seek power as an end. Income levels that place indi-
viduals higher up in their national income chart can increase the
power of those individuals, which has its own independent value. Al-
" As the cohort ages, financial burdens and expenses may be increasing as many re-
spondents marry, have families, and plan for retirement. In addition, other costs may be
growing such as health and dental care, risk hedging (involving disability, life, and long-term
care insurance), and opportunity costs (decreasing likelihood of an individual finding new
work if fired).
For example, cohort studies would by definition contemplate aging populations. In
contrast, a longitudinal study might unexpectedly include shifting populations.
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though absolute income has a concrete role (for example, being ade-
quate to relieve subsistence needs), relative income can offer power
and influence in society (for example, increasing political access).
Procuring more leisure than one's friends may not translate so readily
into more power. If we ascertain that income is rivalrous partly be-
cause of its power implications, we have an additional independent
policy interest in curbing the burgeoning income gap in the country.
Where accumulations of income and wealth confer power, a democ-
ratic society may seek to limit such power by limiting the income and
wealth accumulations of the upper bracket taxpayers. 14
The study referenced by Professor Griffith of a unique group of
individuals experiencing increased income—lottery winners—seems
in line with indications that greater income does not produce corre-
sponding increases in happiness. 15 It also appears consistent with the
distinct psychological concept of impact bias noted above—that indi-
viduals overestimate the intensity of positive or negative feelings from
an event. The case of lottery winners, however, raises the issue that
how one obtains money—not just the level of income—influences the
amount of happiness generated. If third parties show a greater will-
ingness to press lottery winners for financial assistance, as opposed to
pressing other high income individuals, then the additional income
of lottery winners comes with burdens not typically associated with
earning money through business or labor. An interesting line of inves-
tigation would examine whether lottery winners demonstrate less
happiness than other individuals of equal income who acquired their
money through labor or investment activity. 16
Finally, studies of individuals based on the misery index and the
impact of unemployment and inflation should be interpreted to call
for different policies for different respondent populations. One of the
studies Professor Griffith refers to indicates that unemployment re-
14 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity and Progressive Taxa-
tion, 111 YALE U. 1391, 1405-13 (2002) (reviewing Dom Alias Sintuo? THE ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES Or TAXING THE RIG!! (Joel B. Slernrod ed., 2000)); cf. James R. Repetti,
Democracy, Taxes and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 840-49, 851, 873 (2001) (arguing wealth
concentration harms the democratic process by giving too much power to the rich and
that a tax system to prevent such wealth concentration is appropriate).
15 Sec Philip Brick/um et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCIIOL. 917, 920-21 (1978); see also Griffith, supra note 2, at 1388.
16
 Differences in happiness could be driven by internal factors (for example, subjective
feelings of self-worth or justification for one's riches) or external factors (for example, how
others react to wealthier individuals based on the source and nature of the wealth).
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duces welfare more than inflation." This observation, on its own,
might suggest particular policies and allocations of resources; Profes-
sor Griffith specifically offers the proposal that government programs
aimed at aiding the unemployed (or even reducing unemployment)
may be desirable for increasing happiness. The conclusions drawn
from this study, however, probably should be restated to reflect the
profiles of different sets of respondents. It may be that inflation
harms senior citizens, welfare recipients, and the chronically unem-
ployed more than unemployment. In these cases, income support or
measures attacking inflation may generate more benefits than those
targeting unemployment.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR TAXATION FROM THE STUDY
OF INCOME AND HAPPINESS
Returning to the ultimate questions driving Professor Griffith's
analysis—how much progressivity should we have in our tax system
and how it should be designed?—the studies of income and happiness
point in a number of valuable directions. First, in theory, we can have
net redistribution without progressive taxation by working solely
through the expenditure side. 18 Certainly many factors affect the de-
cision of how best to combine the tax side and the spending side, but
does the happiness literature have implications for that balancing
question? For example, does a non-progressive tax system generate
less hostility for redistributive public spending? How might a tax-
payer's conceptions of (or reactions to) a progressive system consti-
tute a "negative" on the happiness dimension? Recalling the psychol-
ogy literature related to impact bias, if taxpayers believe that having
progressive rates (that is, potentially higher rates) will be very un-
pleasant, how should this effect be factored in, even when the actual
pain is less than anticipated due to impact bias and the declining
marginal utility of money? Are we measuring happiness before or af-
ter the dollars are reallocated? Is this contrast muted by the annual
nature of the progressive taxation "event"?
Second, is there a viable role for government to affirmatively
shape and inform taxpayers' calculations of happiness? Perhaps we
should envision the government's role in progressivity policy as more
than decision making about where and how dollars should be col-
17 Griffith, supra note 2, at 1391-92.
° Clearly there are limits to this avenue given that a significant portion of government
spending may be predetermined and not of an obviously redistributive nature.
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lected and allocated. Maybe the role should include providing expla-
nations of the policy based on knowledge about happiness, income,
and cognitive biases. For example, if the reason that European coun-
tries evince more popular support for redistribution draws from their
greater homogeneity, then perhaps a more explicit policy conversa-
tion about the psychological influence of homogeneity and heteroge-
neity can educate and shape popular American views on the subject.
Similarly, a variety of studies indicate that increased levels of income,
past sonic basic point, do not provide corresponding increases in
happiness; in fact, higher taxes with money spent on certain public
goods generate more happiness. Can this information be dissemi-
nated in such a way as to begin to shape individuals' perceptions of
what will, in fact, make them happy?19
Third, an important part of the redistribution debate concerns
the ultimate calculus—how the gains from redistribution compare to
the efficiency costs of higher taxes (such as a decline in work effort).
Although focused on the former (calculating the gains), Professor
Griffith's Article does make the observation in the context of the
cross-national and longitudinal studies that economic growth does
not bring increased happiness. Essentially, the theory maintains that if
economic growth is less valuable than we may have thought (because
it does not really increase happiness), then redistributive policies that
increase happiness through the reallocation of income, but with the
side effect of decreasing economic growth, may not be such a serious
concern. This position must be evaluated in both the short term and
the long term. The net short-term result is plausibly the image de-
scribed above—we achieve vains created from reallocating income at
minimal cost to happiness. 29 In the long term, however, the picture
may be notably different. Even if economic growth does not have a
linear relationship with increased happiness, failure to achieve certain
levels of national economic growth could result in a country being
overtaken (literally or figuratively) by other countries and left without
the ability to recover. In this long-term picture, taxpayers would be
quite unhappy when their deteriorating national situation began to
provide them with fewer or starker choices, even if they did not fully
appreciate economic growth when they had it.
19 A notable caveat here is that where higher income taxpayers feel instability in the
economy or their futures, they may resist more psychologically based pro-redistribution
arguments, at least in the absence of a strong government commitment to a safety net.
2° Such costs would be due to any decline in work or economic growth.
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CONCLUSION
The happiness literature overall seems to support the traditional
marginal utility of income arguments espoused for progressive taxa-
tion. The analysis of this literature, however, also indicates that we
may arrive at more nuanced conclusions about the impact of income
on happiness and that these insights should be taken into account in
moving from broad support for progressive taxation to advocacy of
particular levels of progressivity and related regime design decisions.
This initial investigation into the happiness literature yields a number
of valuable observations for tax policy design, including the potential
importance of the income distribution curve in a country and the po-
tential variation among groups of taxpayers with regard to how in-
come affects happiness. As psychological research into happiness de-
velops, tax law can both draw upon that research for its own policy
needs and help shape the research by more sharply defining the in-
formation needed to craft effective progressive tax policy.
